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LAND USE PLANNING*
RONALD B. RAVIKOFF**
The author initially examines the traditional judicial treat-
ment given master plans. Recent trends indicating a shift in the
traditional view are explored and the author contends that Flor-
ida's Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975 is
at the forefront of these new trends. After discussing in depth the
Act's provisions, the author concludes that the success or failure
of the Act rides on the courts'interpretations of the "consistency"
provisions, and strongly advocates a broad interpretation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act
of 1972' created the Environmental Land Management Study Com-
mittee (ELMS Committee)2 to "study all facets of land resource
management and land development regulation . . . and . . . rec-
ommend . . . new legislation."' 3 In response to this mandate the
Committee studied the American Law Institute's Model Land De-
velopment Code,4 the statutes and cases of various other states, and
consulted with various governmental entities.
One of the final proposals of the ELMS Committee was the
"Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act." The Commit-
tee, through the Act, proposed to make significant changes in the
law of planning and land use control in Florida. The Act was based
on the philosophy that local government was not adequately provid-
ing for land use control under home rule,' and therefore legislation
was needed so that local government would not have a "no regula-
tion" alternative.
It is interesting to note that the Committee rejected the concept
of making the existing planning law mandatory,7 but rather decided
"to replace the whole existing zoning system with a more effective
and flexible system that not only regulates, but helps shape devel-
opment."' The result was a statute requiring a comprehensive plan-
ning process which necessitates the creation of a comprehensive
plan. The scope of this comprehensive plan is defined in the statute.
In 1975, the Florida Legislature enacted the Local Government
Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975.1 It should be noted that this
1. FLA. STAT. ch. 380 (1975).
2. FLA. STAT. § 380.09 (1975).
3. FLA. STAT. § 380.09(2) (1975).
4. THE USE OF LAND: A CrrIzZENs' POLICY GUIDE TO URBAN GROWTH 64 (W. Reilly ed. 1973);
see ALI MODEL LAND DEV. CODE (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1971).
5. O'Connell, Whatever Happened to "Zoning" or What You Nedd to Know about "The
Local Planning Act" But Don't Know What to Ask!, 50 FLA. B.J. 46 (1976).
6. See Municipal Home Rule Powers Act, FLA. STAT. ch. 166 (1975).
7. O'Connell, supra note 5, at 47; see FLA. STAT. ch. 166 (1975).
8. O'Connell, supra note 5, at 47.
9. 1975 Fla. Laws ch. 75-257, §§ 1-17 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161 -.3211 (1975));
1975 Fla. Laws ch. 75-257, §§ 18-19.
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new mandatory planning legislation did not repeal the older op-
tional planning legislation"' and that the two sections should not be
confused. Specifically, the new Act provides that it'shall govern
where there is conflict with any other provision of law relating to
authority to regulate the development of land."
This article will atttempt to analyze Florida's Local Govern-
ment Comprehensive Planning Act. First, a historical background
on the law concerning master plans in general will be discussed.
Then, the recent trends in the legal status of comprehensive plans
will be considered.
II. THE TRADITIONAL JUDICIAL VIEW OF THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN 12
In recent years there has been a considerable amount of activity
throughout the country both on the judicial and legislative fronts
that has affected and will continue to affect the legal status of
master plans. This activity has been particularly evident in Florida.
Beginning in 1926 with the Standard Zoning Enabling Act'3
(SZEA), virtually all state enabling legislation has require that zon-
ing be done "in accordance with a comprehensive plan."' 4
However, there is a lack of clarity with respect to definitions.
Such terms as "comprehensive plan," "master plan," "general
plan," and "municipal plan" are all used interchangeably. For the
purposes of historical discussion, it will be helpful to define certain
terms.
A "comprehensive plan" is a plan which meets the statutory
requirements in a particular state (usually equivalent to SZEA). It
10. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.160*-.315 (1975).
11. FLA. STAT. § 163.3211 (1975); see [1975] FLA. Ar'y GEN. ANN. REP. 280.
12. For more complete discussions of how the master plan has been used in the land use
control controversy, see Mandelker, The Role of the Local Comprehensive Plan in Land Use
Regulation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 900 (1976); Sullivan & Kressel, Twenty Years After-Renewed
Significance of the Comprehensive Plan Requirement, 9 URB. L. ANN. 33 (1975); Tarlock,
Consistency with Adopted Land use Plans as a Standard of Judicial Review: The Case
Against, 9 URa. L. ANN. 69 (1975).
13. ADVISORY COMM. ON.CITY PLANNING AND ZONING, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STAN-
DARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (rev. ed. 1926) [hereinafter cited as SZEA]. SZEA is now
out of print as a government publication, but is reprinted with drafter's comments in ALI
MODEL LAND DEV. CODE 210-21,' app. A (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1968).
14. See, e.g., Municipal Zoning, FLA. STAT. § 176.04 (1971) (repealed 1973); County
Zoning, FLA. STAT. § 133.03 (1969) (repealed 1971). In Florida the municipal zoning enabling
legislation was replaced by the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act, FLA. STAT. ch. 166 (1975).
Counties have zoning power under FLA. STAT. ch. 125 (1975).
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is simply a legal concept that must be satisfied: most enabling
legislation requires the zoning to be "in accord" with it. The
"comprehensive plan" has been a changing concept. One of the
aims of this section will be to examine the evolution of this concept.
A "master plan" is a separate document that historically has
not constituted an ordinance and has represented a broad statement
of policies, goals and objectives for the area it covers. It is a state-
ment of intent, which is generally implemented through the land
use regulatory devices, primarily zoning. It is generally synonymous
with the "plan" referred to in the Standard City Planning Enabling
Act.
It should be noted that the courts originally tended to equate
comprehensive plan" with "zoning ordinance" whereas more re-
cent trends have made the "comprehensive plan" equivalent to a
''master plan."
A. Origins of the Problem: The Standard Enabling Acts
The problems arising from the interpretation of the comprehen-
sive plan stem from the Standard Enabling Acts originally prepared
by the Department of Commerce. The SZEA of 1926 empowered
local governing bodies to adopt zoning regulations "in accordance
with the comprehensive plan."' 5 In 1928, the Standard City Plan-
ning Enabling Act"5 (SPEA) gave planning boards the power to
adopt and carry out a document known alternatively as the
''municipal plan," the "master plan," the "official plan," and the
"city plan."
The primary question which arose under these acts concerned
their interrelationship. Was the "plan" in the SPEA the prerequis-
ite of zoning "in accordance with a comprehensive plan" as man-
dated by the SZEA? There is no indication in the acts themselves
that this was to be the case, nor is there any judicial support for the
logical conclusion that the two acts were meant to complement each
other."I
15. SZEA, supra note 13, at § 3.
16. ADVISORY COMM. ON CITY PLANNING AND ZONING, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STAN-
DARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING AcT (1928) [hereinafter cited as SPEA]. SPEA is now out of
print as a government publication, but is reprinted with drafter's comments in ALI MODEL
LAND DEV. CODE 222-71, app. B (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1968).
17. But cf. Wheeler v. Gregg, 90 Cal. App. 2d 348, 364, 203 P.2d 37, 47-48 (1949). This
court held that zoning "in accord with a plan" refers to a separate plan document.
[Vol. 31:1119
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If the comprehensive plan was a prerequisite for the zoning
ordinance, it certainly is a requirement that has been ignored. For
the most part, zoning has precede planning in the time sequence of
adoption in both of the enabling acts and as a historical fact on the
local levels."8 This inverse relationship between planning and zoning
was discussed in Kozesnik v. Montgomery Township,9 where the
court found that to be "in accordance with a comprehensive plan"
the zoning did not need to be related to a separate planning process.
In discussing the time sequence, the court said:
Thus the historical development did not square with the orderly
treatment of the problem which present wisdom would recom-
mend. And doubtless the need for immediate measures led the
Legislature to conclude that zoning shall not await the develop-
ment of a master plan. Accordingly, as of October 15, 1954, while
there were 371 zoning ordinances in our State, there were 320
planning boards and but 112 master plans."
The majority of courts have followed Kozesnik and have con-
cluded that the comprehensive plan against which the zoning ordi-
nance was to be measured was something other than that produced
under the SPEA. As a result, the courts looked to the comprehensi-
veness of the zoning ordinance itself rather than to some external
standard found in a separate document in order to determine if the
zoning ordinance was "in accordance with the comprehensive
plan."2
In an article"2 which has had a major impact on this area of
judicial thinking, Professor Charles M. Haar examined the plan
requirement. He found that the SZEA provided little authority for
requiring a separate master plan as a precondition to zoning. 3 He
then reviewed the various judicial positions of the "plan" and con-
18. See Freilich, Interim Development Controls: Essential Tools for Implementing Flexi-
ble Planning and Zoning, 49 J. UaB. L. 65, 69 (1971).
19. 24 N.J. 154, 131 A.2d 1 (1957).
20. Id. at 165-66, 131 A.2d at 7. See also Hyland v. Mayor of Morris, 130 N.J. Super.
471, 327 A.2d 675 (App. Div. 1947) which held that a rezoning was in accordance with a
comprehensive plan even though the plan was not adopted until ten months after the rezon-
ing.
21. City of Olean v. Conkling, 157 Misc. 63, 283 N.Y.S. 66 (Sup. Ct. 1935) (construing
New York's enabling act which predated but was similar to SPEA); Coley v. Campbell, 126
Misc. 869, 215 N.Y.S. 679 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
22. Haar, In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1154 (1955).
23. Id. at 1157.
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cluded that the courts had misplaced their emphasis. The courts
were trying to determine "whether the zoning ordinance is a com-
prehensive plan, not whether it is in accordance with a comprehen-
sive plan .. ."I' Haar contended that the comprehensive plan re-
quirement should be read to create a second standard, one that
could measure individual zoning ordinances against the goals of the
master plan.2"
Haar's view of the statutory comprehensive plan as a type of
broad guide in the form of a master plan, on which a variety of land
use control devices should be based, is a minority position among
the courts," although not among planners. 7 This minority position
is, however, one that is gaining ever increasing acceptance."
B. Judicial Treatment of "In Accordance with a Comprehensive
Plan"
The majority view of the statutory comprehensive plan require-
ment is perhaps best found by again looking at Kozesnik v. Mont-
gomery Township." This case, more than any other, stands for the
proposition that zoning is a self-contained activity measured only
against constitutional requirements. The plaintiffs had challenged
a rezoning where no master plan had been adopted, thus contending
that the rezoning could not be "in accordance with a comprehensive
plan." In rejecting this argument the court made several findings
upon which to base its conclusion. First, the planning enabling leg-
islation, although authorizing the creation of a master plan, was
only permissive and not mandatory. Second, the zoning enabling
legislation, while containing the standard requirement of zoning in
accordance with a comprehensive plan, did not make the plan the
same as the optional master plan enunciated in the planning act.
24. Id. at 1173.
25. Id. at 1156.
26. See 3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 21.15, at 609 (2d ed. 1977).
27. See, e.g., Black, The Comprehensive Plan in INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGERS' ASS'N,
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF URBAN PLANNING (W. Goodmand & E. Freund eds. 1968).
Several other documents used in local planning are often confused with the com-
prehensive plan-in particular, the zoning ordinance, official map, and subdivi-
sion regulations. These are specific and detailed pieces of legislation which are
intended to carry out the general proposals of the comprehensive plan.
Id. at 350. See also Woolfe, Zoning is Doing Planning In, 6 PRACTICING PLANNER 10, 13 (June
1976).
28. See section III infra.
29. 24 N.J. 154, 131 A.2d 1 (1957).
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The court's conclusion was further supported by the fact that the
zoning enabling legislation was adopted prior to the planning en-
abling legislation. Finally, the court did not find inherent within
the meaning of the statutory "comprehensive plan" the require-
ment of a separate master plan document." The court felt that the
requirement of the "comprehensive plan" approach was to prevent
''capricious exercise of the legislative power resulting in haphazard
or piecemeal zoning." Further, a "'plan' connotes an integrated
product of a rational process and 'comprehensive' requires some-
thing beyond a piecemeal approach. . . .- 1
Throughout the country the majority of the courts have
adopted the same approach as the Kozesnik court.32 Thus, the gen-
eral rule in the United States today is that the "comprehensive
plan" required by the enabling legislation is to be found within the
confines of the zoning ordinance itself.
33
The Florida courts have provided no divergences from the pat-
tern noted above. As early as 1934, the Supreme Court of Florida,
in State ex rel. Henry v. City of Miami,3 4 said in dicta that where
the authorizing statute so intended, a city must enact "one compre-
hensive zoning ordinance covering the entire city. 315 Thus, the court
indicated that any requirement of comprehensiveness should be ful-
filled within the zoning ordinance itself. The position has been con-
sistently followed by later courts in Florida. 3 The judicial thinking
in Florida on the planning required prior to zoning has been aptly
summarized:
The procedural step of adopting a plan in the form of a
formal document . . . need not necessarily precede the adoption
30. Id. at 166, 131 A.2d at 7.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Lebanon v. Woods, 153 Conn. 182, 215 A.2d 112 (1965); Couch v. Zoning
Comm'n, 141 Conn. 349, 106 A.2d 173 (1954); Keppy v. Ehlers, 253 Iowa 1021, 115 N.W.2d
198 (1962); Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960). Contra, Levine
v. Town of Oyster Bay, 46 Misc. 2d 106, 259 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1964), aff'd 26 App. Div. 2d 583,
272 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1966).
33. Id.
34. 117 Fla. 594, 158 So. 82 (1934).
35. Id. at 598, 158 So. at 83.
36. City of Miami Beach v. Silver, 67 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 1953); Davis v. Sails, 318 So. 2d
214 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975); Jefferson Nat'l Bank v. City of Miami Beach, 267 So. 2d 100 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1972); Town of Belleair v. Moran, 244 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971); City of St.
Petersburg v. Aikin, 208 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 2d Dist.), rev'd on other grounds, 217 So. 2d 315
(Fla. 1968); Staninger v. Jacksonville Expwy. Auth., 182 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966);
Town of Surfside v. Abelson, 106 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1958).
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of a zoning map and corresponding zoning district regulations.
Instead, the requirement that zoning regulations be in conformity
with a comprehensive plan relates to the necessity that they be
comprehensive in character and take into consideration the less-
ening of congestion ...
The requirement that zoning be in furtherance of a compre-
hensive plan thus means that a city must be zoned on a compre-
hensive basis ...
Merely because zoning regulations are enacted following the
adoption of a comprehensive planning report or subsequent to a
review of the community's need and goals does not conclude the
question of the validity of those zoning regulations. As an exercise
of the police power, all zoning ordinances must be reasonable in
their application ....
In determining the validity of a zoning ordinance, therefore,
it must be reviewed in the context of whether it is comprehensive
in scope and implements a general community plan. It also must
be reviewed to determine whether the general plan that it seeks
to implement is reasonable and related to lawful exercise of the
police power.37
It should be noted, however, that there have been recent indica-
tions of change in the lower courts. For example, in Ulrich v. Dade
County,3" the circuit court for Dade County relied on the county
comprehensive plan to uphold a zoning classification. In an unre-
ported case,3" the same court held that a rezoning which deviated
from the county master plan was invalid based solely on this devia-
tion. It was held that the master plan should carry a presumption
of correctness and should be followed unless there are compelling
reasons to deviate from it. Finally, in Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan
Dade County,4 ° the District Court of Appeal, Third District, in
dicta, said that "Florida Statutes . . .authorize . . . comprehen-
sive plans . . . [and] [z]oning changes may not be implemented
where the proposed change will not conform to the comprehensive
plan . ... ,41
37. Faust, Zoning in FLORIDA REAL PROPERTY PRACTICE I1I § 13.3 (2d ed. 1976).
38. 40 Fla. Supp. 34 (Dade Co. Cir. Ct. 1974).
39. Dade County Ass'n v. Dade County Bd. of County Comm'rs, No. 75-26308 (Dade
County Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1975), appeal docketed, Florida 3d Dist. For a discussion of this case
see Miami Herald, Dec. 4, 1975, at 1B, col. 4. The holding in Dade County Ass'n was recently
followed in Castellano v. Crouse, No. 76-21377 (Dade County Cir. Ct. Sept. 7, 1976).
40. 338 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
41. Id. at 868.
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Although the Florida courts apparently have not recognized a
requirement for planning prior to zoning, the legislature has. Prior
to the adoption of the mandatory "Local Government Comprehen-
sive Planning Act" which changed this entire area of law in Florida,
the permissive statute2 governed. It provided that "[a]fter a com-
prehensive plan has been prepared and adopted . . . the governing
body . . may enact . . . a zoning ordinance .... "I'
C. Judicial Treatment of Master Plans
Upon establishing that a "master plan" was not the
"comprehensive plan" required by the enabling legislation, the
courts were still faced with the problem of what weight, if any, to
accord the master plan. The following cases provide a representative
sample of the posture taken by many state courts with regard to
master plans.
In State ex rel. Bateman v. Zachritz,"1 the Supreme Court of
Ohio provided an early basis for holding that there could be a valid
delegation of the legislative power based on a master plan. The
United States Engineers Office had submitted to the city manager
of Cincinnati a flood protection plan for one of its suburbs. A resolu-
tion providing for cooperation in the project was introduced into the
city council, and this resolution was submitted to the planning com-
mission which disapproved it. The City charter provided:
Whenever the commission shall have made a plan of the city or
any part thereof, no public [improvement], or part thereof, shall
be constructed. . . unless. . . approved by the commission...
and the council, by a vote of not less than two-thirds of its mem-
bers shall have the power to overrule. .... .1
The council voted on the resolution, the vote in favor being five to
four, thus defeating the resolution. In upholding the defeat, the
Ohio Supreme Court established that it was not unconstitutional to
delegate legislative power to the planning commission based on a
master plan requirement.
A more definite statement on the master plan's legal status was
promulgated in Lordship Park Association v. Board of Zoning
42. FLA. STAT. ch. 163, pt. 11 (1975).
43. FLA. STAT. § 163,250(1) (1975) (emphasis added).
44. 135 Ohio St. 580, 22 N.E.2d 84 (1939).
45. Id. at 582, 22 N.E.2d at 86.
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Appeals.4" The town had rejected a proposed subdivision even
though it met the requirements of all the ordinances because it did
not conform to the town's master plan. The Supreme Court of Con-
necticut found that before a master plan could be used as a land use
control device, certain safeguards must be provided. Because the
adoption of a town plan is based on the police power, the land-
owner's use of his property may only be restricted by the plan to
the extent reasonably necessary to protect the public health, safety
or welfare. 7 Thus, the court outlined the traditional standard of a
zoning ordinance and established that a master plan must meet
these standards before it can function as a land use control device.
The court further indicated that the plan was merely a set of goals
which the town officials should use as a guide. It was not a tool
which could operate to curtail the rights of a private property owner.
The town was ordered to approve the subdivision.
The court's decision in Lordship Park dovetails quite nicely
with the "comprehensive plan equals zoning ordinance" concept of
Kozesnik.'8 They both place the zoning ordinance as the primary
device of land use control with little room for the master plan.
Kozesnik says the plan is the ordinance, and Lordship Park holds
that the plan must be the equivalent of an ordinance before it has
any legal weight.
It has become apparent that historically the courts have had
to wrestle with the distinction between and interrelationship of
planning and zoning. While dealing with this problem, the Supreme
Court of Ohio broadened the effects of the master plan. In State ex
rel. Kearns v. Ohio Power Co.,'" the question confronting the court
was whether a private utility company with eminent domain power
and a regional service area beyond the municipality was bound by
that municipality's master plan. The court found for the municipal-
ity, holding that a contrary result might ruin the entire planning
scheme by allowing the power company to place its power lines in
any way it pleased. In dicta, the court enunciated the traditional
judicial view of planning and zoning.
46. 137 Conn. 84, 75 A.2d 379 (1950).
47. Id. at 90, 75 A.2d at 381-82, citing Town of Windsor v. Whitney, 95 Conn. 357, 366,
11 A. 354 (1920).
48. See notes 29-33 supra and accompanying text.
49. 163 Ohio St. 451, 127 N.E.2d 394 (1955).
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Although they are sometimes used interchangeably, the terms
"zoning" and "planning," are not synonymous. Zoning is con-
cerned chiefly with the use and regulation of buildings and struc-
tures, whereas planning is of broader scope and significance and
embraces the systematic and orderly development of a com-
munity with particular regard for streets, parks, industrial and
commercial undertakings, civic beauty and other kindred mat-
ters properly included within the police power.'"
The practical consideration which the courts have given master
plans is well demonstrated in Timmerman v. City of New York.',
The issue involved was the proposed location of a sewage treatment
plant which was slightly different from that shown on the master
plan. The court found that the master plan was not intended or
required to specify the exact and precise locations of each and every
desirable item to be indicated in the plan. Rather, the master plan
was to be considered as a "flexible fluid document"; particular im-
provements indicated on it were not to be confined to a specific
location.
A case that perhaps typifies the traditional judicial position on
master plans is Cochran v. Planning Board."5 A property owner had
challenged a master plan's designation of his property claiming it
lowered the value of his land. Finding no controversy, the court
dismissed the case. It was held that the adoption of a master plan
has no legal consequences. "'It would thus appear that even after
the planning board has adopted a master plan, the governing body
is free to ignore the recommendation of the planning board based
on the master plan. . . .'" I The court went on to find that the
master plan was merely a declaration of policy and a disclosure of
an intention which thereafter could be implemented.
Under the traditional view, the master plan was a document
which was recognized as a proper basis for the delegation of legisla-
tive power but not a standard to be used in measuring legislative
enactments. It was merely a statement of goals and policies which
could be ignored virtually at will. When the municipality wished to,
50. Id. at 460, 127 N.E.2d at 399, citing 1 YOKLEY'S ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed.) 2,
3, § 1, Mills v. City of Baton Rouge, 210 La. 830, 839, 28 So. 2d 447, 451 (1946), and Mansfield
& Swett, Inc., v. Town of West Orange, 120 N.J.L. 145, 149, 198 A. 225, 228 (1938).
51. 69 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1946).
52. 87 N.J. Super. 526, 210 A.2d 99 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1965).
53. Id. at 536, 210 A.2d at 104, quoting Cunningham, Controls of Land Use in New
Jersey, 15 RUTGERs L. REV. 1, 19 (1960).
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it could use it as a rational basis for a zoning ordinance and the
courts would view the plan as somewhat persuasive. Thus, while the
municipality might justify its actions based on an adopted plan,. a
private land owner could not attack the municipality because its
actions were inconsistent with the same plan.
D. The Courts Seek a Rational Land Use Policy
After the courts became well settled into their "traditional"
view of master plans, there developed a number of cases which
tended to move away from that approach. These cases accord signif-
icant weight to the concept that the comprehensive plan require-
ment means a master plan. The cases hold that land regulation does
need an overall policy framework. Thus, they require that there be
a relationship between zoning and a land use policy. While this
policy need not exist outside the zoning ordinance itself, an adopted
separate plan is a preferred review standard.
In Eves v. Zoning Board of Adjustment,5" the township adopted
a "flexible selective zoning" procedure (more commonly known as
a floating zone), whereby all the requirements of a special industrial
district zone were delineated in the ordinance, but no boundaries
were set. Rather, the ordinance outlined a procedure to be used in
submitting an application for this zoning on a particular tract of
land. In overturning the ordinance, the court held that it was not
within the scope of the enabling legislation which required that it
be "in accordance with a comprehensive plan." The court found
that the development scheme would itself become the plan and thus
the antithesis of zoning "in accordance with a comprehensive plan."
Since any zoning must be enacted in accordance with a plan, the
court found that the plan must be in some formalized format at the
time of the zoning. Here the town, according to the court, was con-
fusing comprehensive planning with a comprehensive plan, indicat-
ing that the comprehensive plan was not to be found within the
zoning ordinance.
In Udell v. Haas,5" the court was faced with the issue of the
validity of the down-zoning of a commercial area to a residential
use. The court denied the zone change primarily due to a failure to
meet the statutory requirement that zoning be "in accordance with
54. 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960).
55. 21 N.Y.2d 463, 235 N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1968).
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a comprehensive plan."56 The court warned that "our courts must
require local zoning authorities to pay more than mock obeisance to
the statutory mandate that zoning be 'in accordance with a compre-
hensive plan."'' 7 The court then went on to say that "difficulties
involved in developing rational schemes of land use controls become
insuperable when zoning or changes in zoning are followed rather
than preceded by study and consideration."58 The court strongly
stated that the "comprehensive plan" requirement of the enabling
legislation must be based on "the needs and goals of the com-
munity."59
Such a land use policy rationale for restricting the landowner's
use of his property is a change from the traditional police power
rationale."6 This switch in rationale is further evidenced by the cases
in various jurisdictions which require the use of a master plan to
establish a policy rationale for the justification of zoning."
III. THE MASTER PLAN AS A COMPULSORY PREREQUISITE TO LAND USE
REGULATION
A recent trend has emerged in both courts and legislatures
which requires localities to adopt their land use controls within the
framework of an existing master plan. This position has been taken
in only a few jurisdictions, but it is believed that these decisions
represent the "cutting edge" of judicial and legislative thought in
this area.
In Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners,2 homeowners
56. Id. at 476, 235 N.E.2d at 905, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
57. Id. at 470, 235 N.E.2d at 901, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 894.
58. Id. at 471, 235 N.E.2d at 901, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 895.
59. Id. at 476, 235 N.E.2d at 905, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
60. See, e.g., Lordship Park Ass'n v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 137 Conn. 84, 75 A.2d
379 (1950).
61. City of Louisville v. Kavanaugh, 495 S.W.2d 502 (Ky. 1973) (based on an adopted
master plan the court held a refusal to rezone was arbitrary); Aspen Hill Venture v. Montgo-
mery County Council, 265 Md. 303, 289 A.2d 303 (1972); Raabe v. City of Walker, 383 Mich.
165, 174 N.W.2d 789 (1970) (rezoning prevented where a separate master plan had not yet
been adopted and the Kozesnick approach that the zoning ordinance was the comprehensive
plan rejected); Biske v. City of Troy, 381 Mich. 611, 166 N.W.2d 453 (1969), aff'g in part and
rev'g in part, 6 Mich. App. 546, 149 N.W.2d 899 (1967) (an adopted separate master plan
provides a preferred standard of review for zoning). But see, F.H. Uelner Precision Tools &
Dies, Inc., v. City of Dubuque, 190 N.W.2d 465 (Iowa 1971) (if the zoning ordinance and
master plan were inconsistent, the zoning ordinance controls); Duran Invs. v. Muhlenberg
Township, 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 143, 309 A.2d 450 (1973) (held that if the zoning ordinance
requirements for a P.U.D. were met, it had to be granted even if contrary to the master plan).
62. 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
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opposed a zone change for mobile homes which had alrady been
approved by the county commission. The mastei plan for the county
showed this land to be designated as a single family residential use,
and the planning commission had failed to support the change. The
Supreme Court of Oregon, sitting en banc, held the zone change
invalid. The court decided that the statutory mandate that zoning
must be based on a comprehensive plan meant a separate master
plan. After noting that the purpose of the zoning ordinance is to
implement the master plan, the court pointed out that "both are
intended to be parts of a single integrated procedure for land use
control." 3 The zoning ordinance gives effect to the principles and
policy determinations embodied in the plan.
The court further stated that the "comprehensive plan" was a
basic document geared to population, land use, and economic fore-
casts, all of which should be the basis for land use control devices.
The court concluded:
We believe that the state legislature has conditioned the county's
power to zone upon the prerequisite that the zoning attempt to
further the general welfare of the community through conscious-
ness, in a prospective sense, of the factors 4 mentioned above. In
other words, except as noted later in this opinion, it must be
proved that the change is in conformance with the comprehensive
plan. 5
The court's phraseology is significant here because the court is
equating the principles of the master plan with the general health,
safety, and welfare.
Shortly, after Fasano, the Supreme Court of Oregon was again
faced with the question of the relationship between the master plan
and zoning. In Baker v. City of Milwaukie,"1 a landowner was pro-
testing the development of property adjacent to his. The develop-
ment was at a density higher than that permitted by the master
plan but in conformity with that permitted by the existing ordi-
nance. The lower court found that there was no requirement that
the zoning be in accordance with a plan, and that the existing mas-
ter plan, adopted by resolution, could not be placed in a superior
63. Id. at 582, 507 P.2d at 27.
64. The court is referring to the statutory standards for a master plan.
65. 264 Or. at 583, 507 P.2d at 28.
66. 271 Or. 500, 533 P.2d 772 (1975), aff'g in part and reu'g in part, 17 Or. App. 689, 520
P.2d 479 (1974).
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position to a zoning regulation adopted by ordinance.
In reversing, the Supreme Court of Oregon examined the func-
tion of a master plan and found it similar to a "constitutional"
document which provides a broad statement that is to be imple-
mented by the local legislature. The court then gave the plan prefer-
ence over prior zoning ordinances, pointing out that such a prefer-
ence was necessary to prevent cities from adopting a plan and then
relegating it to oblivion through continued use of the prior zoning
regulations. The court noted that
[tihe adoption of the general plan is, in effect, the adoption of
a policy, and in many respects, entirely new policy. The plan is
of a permanent and general character, it is a declaration of public
purpose and, as such, supposedly sets forth what kind of a city
the community wants and, supposedly represents the judgment
of the electors of the city with reference to the physical form and
character the city is to assume. 7
The court then imposed a duty on the city, upon its adoption
of a master plan, to implement the plan through its zoning ordi-
nances. The court summarized its position in language that will
undoubtedly have a majoi influence in land use law.
In summary, we conclude that a comprehensive plan is the con-
trolling land use planning instrument for a city. Upon passage of
a comprehensive plan a city assumes a responsibility to effec-
tuate that plan and conform prior conflicting zoning ordinances
to it. We further hold that the zoning decisions of a city must be
in accord with that plan and a zoning ordinance which allows a
more intensive use than that prescribed in the plan must fail."
The holding in Baker was refined in Marracci v. City of
Scappoose." This court interpreted Baker to stand not for the prop-
osition of literal conformance between the land use decision and the
comprehensive plan, but merely as requiring the plan to act as an
outside limit. Thus, a locality can adopt regulations more stringent
than those called for by the plan and still be in compliance."
A similar series of cases in Virginia is interesting because the
courts do not adhere to the strong position taken by the Oregon
67. Id. at 513, 533 P.2d at 778, citing O'Loane v. O'Rourke, 231 Cal. App. 2d 774, 785,
42 Cal. Rptr. 283, 289 (1965).
68. Id. at 514, 533 P.2d at 779 (emphasis added).
69. 26 Or. App. 131, 552 P.2d 552 (1976).
70. Id. at -, 552 P.2d at 553.
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courts, but rather seem to take the position adopted in Udell v.
Haas.7 However, the actual effect of the cases is to place the master
plan in a stronger position than Udell would.
In past years, Fairfax County, Virginia, has been trying to re-
vise its planning and zoning gtructure while dealing with the prob-
lems which have resulted from being one of the fastest growing
counties in the country. 2 In an effort to control its burgeoning
growth rate, the county adopted several "no growth" positions
which resulted in litigation. Several of these deal with the functions
of a master plan.
In Board of Supervisors v. Snell Construction Corp.,73 the Su-
preme Court of Virginia reversed a down-zoning that went below the
density recommended by the master plan. The court found that
state legislation, while not making the master plan a zoning ordi-
nance, did make it a comprehensive guideline for zoning ordinances.
The exact location of zone boundaries was to be determined through
the zoning process, but in making a zoning judgment the governing
body was required to consider the dictates of the master plan as well
as existing property characterisitics.
More recently, the Supreme Court of Virginia decided Board of
Supervisors v. Allman,7 which involved a tract of land of over 300
acres outside Washington, D.C. near the "new town" of Reston. The
plaintiff applied for a rezoning from single family homes to a
planned development district of three dwelling units to the acre. It
was denied by the county. Although the court's decision revolved
primarily around development timing and the adequacy of public
facilities in holding that the refusal to rezone was invalid, the
court's comments about the master plan are noteworthy. The court
stated what can be considered to be representative of the majority
position in the courts. That is, the master plan does not have the
status of a zoning ordinance.75 Rather, it is only advisory in nature
and serves merely as a guide to a zoning body. However, the plan
in existence at the time would have permitted the development
sought. The court was able to use this factor along with the public
71. 21 N.Y.2d 463, 235 N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1968); see text accompanying note
55 supra.
72. Hartzer, Comprehensive Plans Edge Zoning Ordinances as Legal Documents for
Development, 10 AIP NEWSLETTER No. 9 at 6 (Sept. 1975).
73. 214 Va. 655, 202 S.E.2d 889 (1974).
74. 215 Va. 434, 211 S.E.2d 48, cert. denied 96 S. Ct. 300 (1975).
75. Id. at 441, 211 S.E.2d at 52.
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facility argument and a- finding of "inconsistent and discrimina-
tory" action (due to rezonings on similar property in the area) to
reach the conclusion that the refusal was not valid.
In a case decided the same day as Allman, the Supreme Court
of Virginia demonstrated a further movement towards support of
the master plan in zoning disputes. In City of Richmond v.
Randall,6 a rezoning request was upheld on a parcel of land that was
designated as a "transitional" use or zone in the master plan when
the rezoning was found to be designed to implement the plan desig-
nation.
In an ironic reversal of positions from Allman, Fairfax County
tried to use the master plan to support its denial of a rezoning in
Board of Supervisors v. Williams." The plan had stated a policy of
holding back development until the necessary facilities were avail-
able. However, the trial court's findings of fact showed: public faci-
lities were or soon would be available; nearby properties similarly
situated had been rezoned; existing zoning was unreasonable; and
the denial of, the rezoning was arbitrary and capricious. The Su-
preme Court of Virginia affirmed these findings and struck down the
zoning and also any hope that the master plan would provide pro-
tection. The court pointed out that the Board used the density
provisions of the plan to permit the development of some property
but used the timing provisions to deny similar development of other
property in the same area."8
This holding is particularly interesting in light of the recent
trend in exclusionary zoning cases 9 which have struck down zoning
ordinances enacted for exclusionary purposes. This decision indi-
cates that although master plans may be given a new and expanded
role in the land use regulatory system, the courts will not permit
their use in place of a zoning ordinance as an exclusionary device.
Florida's adoption of the Local Government Comprehensive
Planning Act of 1975 is yet another step in the ever growing trend
requiring a rational planning basis for land use regulations. It is
76. 215 Va. 506, 211 S.E.2d 56 (1975).
77. 216 Va. 49, 216 S.E.2d 33 (1975).
78. Id. at -. , 216 S.E.2d at 41.
79. See, e.g., Sussna, Attempt at Realism-or Another Look at Exclusionary Zoning,
1974 PLANNING, ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN INST. 83; Zuger, Exclusionary Zoning, 50 U. NORE
DAME L. REV. 45 (1973); Note, Exclusionary Zoning: An Overview, 47 TuL. L. REv. 1056
(1973).
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suggested that this Act may be the most far reaching piece of legisla-
tion yet affecting the legal impact of master plans.
IV. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING ACT OF 1975
A. Background
The relationship of traditional land use controls (e.g., zoning)
to land use planning is a concern that, in the past, has been left to
the desires of local government. However, in addition to the recent
judicial trends,"0 there have been developments on the legislative
front which indicate a marked shift away from solely local concern.
This change can be explained by considering several influences. The
planning process has been seen as a more important control tool
because of the negative position taken by the courts on apparently
arbitrary local decisions.8' There also has been a renewed concern
for our environment and a realization that our existing system of
controlling development is not working. Perhaps, most significantly,
there has been a growing awareness that land use control must have
a cohesive policy supporting it, and often this policy must be based
upon a much larger geographical area than is covered by a local
government.
Due to this impetus, in recent years, there has been a dramatic
upsurge of innovative state legislation in land use control methods.
This trend, characterized by one commentator as a "quiet revolu-
tion," 2 is based on the recognition that the solution to "problems
such as pollution, destruction of fragile natural resources, the shor-
tage of decent housing," and many others is "simply beyond the
capacity of local governments acting alone," and can only be solved
by state action. 3
Florida's movement to joint this "quiet revolution" was
spurred, as have been many such actions, by a crisis-the drought
of 1971.11 The Governor called together experts for a conference on
water management in South Florida. The conference called for the
state to develop a comprehensive land and water policy.85 The re-
80. See section III supra.
81. See generally R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME (1966).
82. F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1971).
83. Id. at 3.
84. COLLEGE OF ARCHITECTURE, UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA, AN ANALYSIS OF THE FLORIDA LOCAL
GOVERNMENT COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING ACT OF 1975 (1975), at 7.
85. THE USE OF LAND, supra note 4, at 64.
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sponse by the Governor was to appoint a Task Force on Resource
Management." In 1972 this Task Force presented a package of legis-
lation 7 whose key was a land management bill based on the model
land development code of the American Law Institute." The key act
was the Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972.19
A section of this Act established the Environmental Land Manage-
ment Study Committee (ELMS Committee).o The Committee was
charged with the responsibility of studying the state's land resource
management and land development regulations." One of the recom-
mendations of the ELMS Committee, introduced in the 1974 Legis-
lature, was the Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act.9"
The Committee felt that only if local governments throughout the
state were required to participate in the planning process could the
policy goals be achieved. 3 The Act was introduced in 1974 but died
on the calendar. However, in 1975 a revised version was introduced
and passed into law. The most significant difference in the 1975 Act
was the absence of funding for local planning.9
Generally speaking, the Act requires all municipalities and
counties in Florida to prepare and adopt a comprehensive plan by
July 1, 1979.11 The required comprehensive plan must contain cer-
tain "elements" or areas of coverage" and be adopted under certain
set procedures. 7 Perhaps most significantly, the adopted plan has
the legal status of law. 8 These and other provisions of the Act are
discussed in detail below.
86. COLLEGE OF ARCHITECTURE, supra note 84, at 7.
87. RuBino, Florida's Land Use Law, 46 STATE Gov'T 172, 173 (1973).
88. ALI, supra note 4.
89. FLA. STAT. ch. 380 (1975); see Finnell, Saving Paradise: The Florida Environmental
Land and Water Management Act of 1972, 1973 Uri. L. ANN. 103.
90. FLA. STAT. § 380.09 (1975). Nine of the committee members were appointed by the
Governor, three by the President of the Senate, and three by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives. See FLA. STAT. § 380.09(1) (1975).
91. FLA. STAT. § 380.09(2) (1975).
92. E. BARTLEY, LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING ACT OF 1975: AN INFORMA-
TIONAL SUMMARY (1975) at 4.
93. Id. at 3.
94. COLLEGE OF ARCHrrECTURE, supra note 84, at 8.
95. FLA. STAT. § 163.3167(2) (1975).
96. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177 (1975).
97. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3181, .3184 (1975).
98. FLA. STAT. § 163.3194 (1975).
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B. Procedural Provisions of the Act
1. MANDATORY PLANNING
The Act requires each municipality and county in the state to
adopt a comprehensive plan prior to July 1, 1979.11 The plan'00 and
the method of its adoption must conform to the Act's require-
ments.'
The Act imposes harsh penalties for failure to comply with this
mandate. Any local body which fails to adopt a plan will have the
comprehensive plan of its immediately superior unit of government
imposed on it, thereby removing local control." 2
All local governments must have designated a "local planning
agency," and notified the Division of State Planning of the designa-
tion by July 1, 1976.0° The local agency is responsible for the prepa-
ration of the plan and for the holding of public hearings. This agency
may be a local planning commission, the planning department of
the local government, or a council of local governments. 04
Approximately 460 local government units fall under the provi-
sions of the Act. Of these, thirteen municipalities received exten-
sions for the designation of a local planning agency, five municipali-
ties did not designate and two municipalities indicated that they
would not participate. The responsibilities for the latter seven mu-
nicipalities were taken over by their respective counties.'" 5
Various types of governmental bodies have been appointed as
local planning agencies despite the wording of the Act.0 6 It has been
reported that "city councils, county commissions, local planning or
zoning boards, planning departments, new planning agencies on top
of existing ones and . . . a single city commissioner"''07 have all been
designated as local planning agencies.
99. A recent move to extend this deadline by two years was killed in the Florida Legisla-
ture. IV AIP/FSU LEGISLATIVE REPORTING SERVICE No. 5 at 1 (April 22, 1976).
100. FLA. STAT. § 163.3167 (1975).
101. Id.
102. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3167(4), .3167(5) (1975). The ability to enforce this provision is
questionable, given the absence of funding, should there be wholesale disaffirmance of the
Act by local governments.
103. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3167(8), .3174(1) (1975).
104. FLA. STAT. § 163.3174(1) (1975).
105. O'Connell, Status Report: Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975,
FLORIDA ENVT'L & URB. ISSUES, January/February, 1977 at 8, 9.
106. See text accompanying note 104 supra.
107. O'Connell, supra note 105, at 9.
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One commenator has noted the "flexibility" that the Act pro-
vides regarding the type of entity that can be appointed as the local
planning agency. 08 It is suggested that no such flexibility exists.
Rather the Act appears to manifest an intent to have a traditional
planning agency act as the local planning agency, and certainly it
should be one separate from the governing body. In describing the
local planning agency, the Act indicates that the governing body
must establish the local planning agency by ordinance,' may pre-
scribe funds for it,1' and must assign it responsibilities."' The Act
also provides different public hearing requirements for considera-
tion of the proposed plan by the local planning agency and enact-
ment of the plan by the governing body."' It appears evident from
the Act that there was a clear intent to have the plan prepared and
proposed by some other body than the local governing body. Logic
would dictate that to have the local planning agency be one and the
same as the governing body would seriously limit the amount of
unbiased and independent input into the plan. Such an action
would politicize the plan and, in general, undermine the intent of
the Act.
2. STATUS OF EXISTING COMPREHENSIVE PLANS
The Act allows an existing plan to maintain its current status
until a new plan is adopted. However, existing plans will not suffice
to meet the Act's goal and consequently, a new plan must be written
and adopted. Nevertheless, the existing plan may provide the basis
for a new comprehensive plan."'
3. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
The original act had a simple provision requiring the governing
body to provide for public participation in the planning process." '
However, the enactment of a much more demanding provision indi-
cates that the legislature apparently decided the original provision
108. Id.
109. FLA. STAT. § 163.3174(2) (1975).
110. FLA. STAT. § 163.3174(4) (1975).
111. FLA. STAT. § 163.3174(5) (1975).
112. See section IV, B, 5 infra.
113. FLA. STAT. § 163.3197 (1975).
114. FLA. STAT. § 163.3181 (1975).
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was inadequate." 5 Specifically, under the new provision the local
governments must "provide for broad dissemination of the pro-
posals and alternatives, opportunity for written comments, [and]
public hearings after due public notice. . . .,," In addition, where
the proposal deals with less than five percent of the land area of the
jurisdiction, each land owner affected must be notified by mail of
any public hearing."7 When the proposal covers more than five per-
cent, a specific notice (its wording is incorporated in the legisla-
tion"') must be publicized twice in a local paper. 19 Both hearings
must be held after 5 p.m. on a weekday. The first must be held
approximately seven days after the first advertisement and the sec-
ond hearing about two weeks after the first hearing."
4. PUBLIC NOTICE
The local agency must hold hearings on the plan after due
public notice. The Act specifies that due public notice means publi-
cation of a notice of the time, place, and purpose of the hearing at
least twice in a newspaper of general circulation in the area. The
first publication must be not less than fourteen days prior to the
date of the hearing and the second to be at least five days prior to
the date of the hearing. 21
Thus, there are two public notice requirements. The public
notice requirements as outlined in the preceding paragraph, found
115. 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-155 § 3 (amending FLA. STAT. § 163.3181 (1975)) (current
version at FLA. STAT. § 163.3181 (Supp. 1976)).
116. FLA. STAT. § 163.3181(2) (Supp. 1976).
117. FLA. STAT. § 163.3181(3)(a) (Supp. 1976).
118. Notice of Restriction on Land Use
The (name of local government unit) proposes to restrict the use of land
within the area shown in the map in this advertisement. A public hearing on the
increase will be held on (date and time) at (meeting place).
The advertisement shall also contain a geographic location map which clearly
indicates the area covered by the proposed ordinance. The map shall include
major street names as a means of identification of the area.
In lieu of publishing the advertisements set out in this paragraph, the local
governmental unit may mail a notice to each person owning real property within
the area covered by the ordinance. Such notice shall clearly explain the proposed
ordinance and shall notify the person of the time, place, and location of both
public hearings on the proposed ordinance.
FIA. STAT. § 163.3181(3)(b)(2), (3) (Supp. 1976).
119. FLA. STAT. § 163.3181(3)(b)(2) (Supp. 1976).
120. FLA. STAT. § 163.3181(3)(b)(1) (Supp. 1976).
121. FLA. STAT. § 163.3164(16) (1975).
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in Florida Statutes section 163.3164 (16), refer to meetings for
"consideration of the proposed plan or amendments there by the
local planning agency or by local governing body.' ' 2 2 The notice
by mail requirements outlined in the prior section on public parti-
cipation apply "whenever a local governing body considers the
enactment of an ordinance dealing with the land use element of a
comprehensive plan.'
'2 3
5. ADOPTION OF THE PLAN
The Act specifies the following steps which must be undertaken
prior to the valid adoption of a new plan under the Act: 24
1. Sixty days prior to adoption of the plan by the governing
body, the governing body must
(a) send a copy of the plan to the Division of State
Planning for written comment; 25
(b) send a copy of the plan to the regional planning
agency for written comment; 26
(c) send a copy of the plan to the county planning
department; '2
(d) send copies of the plan to any other unit of govern-
ment that requests it;' and
(e) make a finding that the local planning agency has
held public .hearings on the proposed plan, and that due
public notice has been afforded . 2
2. The state must, within sixty days of receipt of the proposed
plan, send its comments back to the governing body. If the Divi-
sion of State Planning has any objections to the proposed plan,
the governing body has four weeks in which to reply. The govern-
ing body cannot take any action on the proposed plan until two
weeks after the transmittal of its reply. These written communi-
cations between the State and the local governing body must
become a part of the public record when the plan is up for adop-
tion.130
122. FLA. STAT. § 163.3181(2) (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
123. FLA. STAT. § 163.3181(3) (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
124. FLA. STAT. § 163.3184 (1975).
125. FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(1)(a) (1975).
126. FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(1)(b) (1975).
127. FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(1)(c) (1975).
128. FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(1)(d) (1975).
129. FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(1)(e) (1975).
130. FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(2) (1975).
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As of the most recent reports, the Division of State Planning
has received plans or portions of plans from twenty-five local gov-
ernments."'
The same procedure as outlined above applies to the county
and regional planning agencies.'32 The time periods for review by the
state, regional, and county agencies run concurrently.1 3
Upon completion of this process, the governing body may adopt
the plan by not less than a majority vote. The relationship of this
adoption requirement to existing adoption provisions was recently
questioned. The Broward County charter provided that a land use
plan adopted by the planning council must be enacted into law
unless rejected by a unanimous vote of the County Commission,
thus directly conflicting with that provision of the Act which re-
quired a majority vote of the governing body. The Attorney General
found that the Act controlled since the Act provides that when it
conflicts with any other provision it shall control unless the other
provisions are more stringent.' 3'
Copies of the adopted plan must be sent to the Division of State
Planning, the regional planning agency, the county planning
agency, and any other governmental unit requesting it.' 3
It should be noted that there is no "veto" provided in the Act
for the agencies to which submittal is required. The submission is
solely for informational purposes. The local governing body must
show in its minutes when adopting the plan or its elements that it
has considered the comments from the various agencies. But the Act
specifically states that the local body is not bound to accept such
comments or recommendations.
This adoption procedure is mandatory and no "half-way" mea-
sures can be followed. The Attorney General found that comprehen-
sive plans can be adopted only in conformance with the Act's provi-
sions.'36 No interim plans are authorized which would act as stop-
gaps until a full plan is adopted.
131. O'Connell, supra note 105, at 9.
132. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3184(3), .3184(4) (1975).
133. Id.
134. [1975] FLA. Arr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 280, quoting 1975 Fla. Laws ch. 75-257, § 17
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 163.3211 (1975)).
135. FLA. STAT. § 163.3184(7) (1975).
136. Fla. Att'y Gen. Op. 076-160 (Aug. 11, 1976).
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COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OR ELEMENT REVIEW
AND ADOPTION PROCESS *
PUBLIC Ist Notice 14 Days
NOTICE(S) 2nd Notice 5 Days
2 PUBLIC HEARING(S)
ILPA RECOMMENDATION TO THE
LOCAL GOVERNING BODY
LOCAL GOVERNING
BODY REVIEW
TRANSMIT FOR REVIEW & COMMENT TO:
STATE * COUNTY 60-DAY REVIEA5 REGION * OTHER PERIOD
LOCAL GOVERNING BODY RESPONSE WITHIN 4
TO OBJECTIONS WEEKS
MINIMUM7WAITING PERIOD 2 WEEKS(ONLY IF OBJECTIONS)
ADOPTION BY LOCAL GOVERNING BODY8 AFTER DUE PUBLIC NOTICE & PUBLIC HEARING
TRANSMIT TO:
* STATE e COUNTY
* REGION * OTHER
* Source: DEP'T OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, A LocAL OFFICIAL'S GUIDE TO THE LOCAL GOVERN-
MENT COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING AcT.
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6. AMENDMENT OF THE PLAN
Once a comprehensive plan has been adopted under the Act, it
can only be amended in accordance with the Act's requirements.'37
Two types of amendments are specified by the Act-a comprehen-
sive amendment and a specific amendment. A specific amendment
is one which changes a use in the land use portion of the comprehen-
sive plan, or changes a residential density on a land area provided
that the total extent of the land affected by the change is less than
five percent of the total land area covered by the plan.
All amendments that are not specific amendments are compre-
hensive amendments. A specific amendment may be made by the
local governing body alone. A comprehensive amendment must fol-
low the procedure used in adopting the original plan.'38
It should be noted that the section detailing amendment proce-
dures appears unclear and seems limited to amendments to the land
use portion of the plan. No mention is made of amendments to the
various other sections of the plan.
7. UPDATE OF THE PLAN
The Act requires the local planning agency to prepare periodic
reports on the comprehensive plan. These reports are to be sent to
the governing body at least once every five years.3 ' The reports must
evaluate the plan's success or failure and discuss: (1) major problem
areas within the community; (2) the condition of each element in
the comprehensive plan at the time of its adoption and at the time
of the report; (3) the comprehensive plan's objectives as compared
with the actual results at the time of the report; (4) the extent to
which unanticipated and unforeseen problems and opportunities
have occurred; and (5) suggested changes in the comprehensive
plan.
This report must be submitted to the Division of State Plan-
ning, the county planning agency, and the regional planning agency.
137. FLA. STAT. § 163.3187 (1975).
138. See section IV, B, 5 supra.
139. FLA. STAT. § 163.3191(1) (1975).
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MAJOR PLANNING ACTIVITIES -
KEY DATE AND TIMEFRAMES*
• JULY 1. 1976 - DESIGNATION OF THE LOCAL PLANNING AGENCY (LPA)
The local governing body must designate an LPA unless a
request for a one year extension has been granted by the
state land planning agency (Division of State Planning,
Department of Administration)
FINAL DATE FOR DESIGNATION OF LPAJULY 1. 1977 - UNDER EXTENSION PROVISIONS
Beyond this date, the responsibilities of the LPA are assumed
by the next higher unit of government, i.e., the county is
responsible for the LPA functions of a non-designating
municipality. The Division of State Planning is responsible
for the LPA functions of a non-designating county.
" JULY 1. 1979 - ADOPTION OF COMPREHENSIVE PLAN
All units of local government must prepare and adopt a
comprehensive plan by July 1, 1979.
" JULY 1, 1980 - EXTENSION ON ADOPTION OF COMPREHENSIVE PLAN
The Division of State Planning may extend the deadline for
comprehensive plan adoption by one year if due cause can
be presented by the local governing body. A second one year
extension may be authorized with a deadline of July 1, 1981.
* FIVE YEARS AFTER PLAN ADOPTION - EVALUATION AND APPRAISAL
An evaluation and appraisal report by the LPA must be sent
to the governing body. This report is to be transmitted
to specified agencies (see section 6.4). Review and/or
amendments of plans may occur at more frequent intervals.
* INCORPORATIONS AFTER EFFECTIVE DATE OF ACT
Any municipality which incorporates after the effective
date of this Act (July 1, 1975) has three years to
prepare and adopt a comprehensive plan. Such plan
need not be adopted prior to July 1, 1979.
* Source: DEP'T OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, A LocAL OFFICIAL'S GUIDE To THE LOCAL GOVERN-
MENT COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING ACT.
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C. Elements of a Plan Under the Act
Requirements imposed by the Act for all comprehensive plans
fall generally into one of three groupings: mandatory general re-
quirements, mandatory specific requirements, and optional specific
requirements.
1. MANDATORY GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
The Act imposes the following five general requirements on all
comprehensive plans.'40
First, the plan must be in such a format that it has adequate
descriptive materials in either graphic or written form.", However,
it should be noted that no specific format is required by the Act.
More traditional forms of planning usually placed great reliance on
physical planning and design. Thus, frequently, the plan consisted
of a map or series of maps. The Act, however, mandates a far wider
range of planning areas than just physical land planning. In recogni-
tion of this the Act allows a high degree of flexibility in the format
in which the plan may be presented.
Second, the various sections of the new plan must be coordi-
nated with each other. The sections must be internally consistent
as well as consistent with each other. In addition, the comprehen-
sive plan must be economically feasible."'
Third, the economic assumptions on which the plan is based
must be set out in the plan. The sections of the plan dealing with
capital improvements must be supported by a capital improve-
ments program giving costs, priorities, and proposed funding
sources."' It is suggested that while this is a laudable goal, it is
perhaps inappropriate to place the capital improvements program
within the context of the comprehensive plan. Capital improve-
ments programing is far too speculative an area to be placed within
a plan that should require little amending within a five year pe-
riod."' This provision reflects an underlying policy inherent within
the Act to create a highly specific document. This policy may be
self-defeating. One leading commentator noted that "[a]bove all,
the general plan must be distinguished from those specific and de-
tailed documents which are intended to implement it, such as . ..
140. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(1)-(5) (1975).
141. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(1) (1975).
142. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(2) (1975).
143. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(3) (1975).
144. FLA. STAT. § 163.3191(1) (1975).
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the capital-improvements priority and financing programs."' 45 Cer-
tainly, a requirement that local plans consider linkages among the
plan elements and a capital facilities program is desirable, but to
require the plan to contain "fiscal proposals relating . . .to esti-
mated costs, priority ranking relative to other proposed capital ex-
penditures, and proposed funding sources"'46 creates excessive rigid-
ity.
Fourth, the Act requires the new plan to be coordinated with
the comprehensive plans of the state, the county, and adjacent
municipalities. In order to meet this requirement the plan must
include a specific policy statement indicating the relationship of the
proposed development of the area to the comprehensive plans of the
state, county, and adjacent municipalities.'47 The Act creates
"technical advisory committees" to be established within each
county to help coordinate the comprehensive plans. Each unit of
local government must appoint one person to the committee."'
Finally, the new comprehensive plan must contain policy rec-
ommendations for its implementation.'49
2. MANDATORY SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
In addition to the mandatory general requirements, the follow-
ing ten specific requirements must be included in the plan.15°
a. Land Use
The new comprehensive plan must include a section on future
land use which will designate the general distribution, location, and
extent of the uses of land for housing, business, industry, agricul-
ture, recreation, conservation, education, public buildings and
grounds, other public facilities, and other categories of public and
private uses of land.' This section of the plan is obviously the
"key", section, as it is central to all the other elements. It also
provides some repetition. For example, the recreation part of the
land use plan certainly will repeat much of the material in the
recreation element and of course the two elements must be closely
coordinated. In addition, the future land use plan must include a
145. T. KENT, THE URBAN GENERAL PLAN 102 (1964).
146. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(3) (1975).
147. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(4) (1975).
148. FLA. STAT. § 163.3207 (1975).
149. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(5) (1975).
150. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(a)-(j) (1975).
151. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(a) (1975).
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statement of the standards to be followed in the control and distri-
bution of population densities and building and structure densi-
ties.' 5 Such standards are obviously aimed at the problem of growth
management. This is one area where it is possible that intergovern-
mental coordination will be difficult to achieve. It can be argued
that the internal distribution of population densities within local
jurisdictions is a problem that is best left to the municipality, while
the establishment of density levels and growth rate in a regional
pattern is a state matter. Likewise, while residential patterns might
be left to local decisionmakers, perhaps the location of low-income
housing is best left to regional or state decisionmakers. Thus, it is
suggested that the legislators should have indicated the level of
government that would deal with each issue. Alternatively, the leg-
islature should have given guidance to planners who deal with prob-
lems which, though left for local governmnt, raise issues of regional
or statewide concern.
Another indication of the importance to be afforded this ele-
ment of the plan can be found by examining other portions of the
Act. The amendment provision'53 specifically sets standards which
vary according to the percentage of the land involved.' 5' The provi-
sions of the Act dealing with legal status' 5 specifically refer to the
effect of regulation on land affected by certain actions.'" Given that
traditional comprehensive plans were only land use plans, this em-
phasis is not unexpected.
b. Traffic
The Act requires a traffic circulation plan which examines the
types, locations, and extent of existing and proposed transportation
arteries.'57
c. Public Utilities
The plan must include a general section on sanitary sewers,
solid waste disposal, drainage facilities, and potable water. While
this element may be comprised of a detailed engineering plan, it is
not required. The provision of these services must be correlated to
152. Id.
153. FLA. STAT. § 163.3187 (1975).
154. See section IV, B, 6 supra.
155. FLA. STAT. § 163.3194 (1975).
156. See section IV, D, infra.
157. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(b) (1975).
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the principles and guidelines for future land use.' This correlation
is certainly necessary. It has been widely recognized that the exten-
sion of public utilities is as effective a land use control device as the
more traditional zoning.159
d. Conservation
The Act requires a plan to have a section on conservation for
the development, utilization, and protection of natural resources
such as air, water, soils, beaches, wildlife, etc.' This is not one of
the traditional elements found in comprehensive plans and is cer-
tainly a commendable response to present environmental concerns.
e. Recreation
The Act requires a recreation section giving a system of public
and private sites for recreation. The sites would include both natu-
ral and man-made facilities."'
Certainly, recreation planning is both a traditional and a neces-
sary part of the comprehensive planning process. Yet one questions
the need for this section, which apparently limits itself to recreation
site designation, when the exact same thing should be done in the
land use element.
f. Housing
The plan must include a section on housing. This section must
deal with establishing standards, plans, and principles to be fol-
lowed in providing housing for existing residents and the antici-
pated population growth of the area. In addition, the plan must deal
with the elimination of substandard dwellings,' 2 the improvement
of existing housing,6 3 the provision of adequate sites for future hous-
ing, ' the provision for relocation housing,'65 the identification of
158. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(c) (1975).
159. Golden v. Planning Bd. of the Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291
(1972) testifies to the truth of this statement.
160. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(d) (1975).
161. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(e) (1975).
162. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(f)(2) (1975).
163. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(f)(3) (1975).
164. Future housing includes housing for low and moderate income families and mobile
homes, with supporting infrastructure and community facilities. FLA. STAT. §
163.3177(6)(f(4) (1975).
165. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(f)(5) (1975).
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houging for purpogeg of congervation, rehabilitation, or replace-
ment,' and the formulation of housing implementation pro-
grams.' 7 Obviously, not all of these requirements apply to all mu-
nicipalities.
The importance of this provision cannot be overemphasized. A
difficulty with growth control and environmental protection policies
is that local governments, sometimes inadvertently and sometimes
not, can use these policies and programs to exclude housing for low-
income groups. The judiciary is becoming increasingly sensitive to
the need for local land use controls to accommodate housing for all
income groups.' This section of the Act will hopefully force local
governments to concern themselves with the housing issue, both to
meet housing needs and to ensure judicial approval of land use
controls aimed at environmental protection and growth manage-
ment.
g. Coastal Protection
Those units of local government lying in a coastal zone as de-
fined by the Coastal Zone Management Act of 197269 must adopt a
protection section in their comprehensive plan. 70
h. Intergovernmental Coordination
The Act requires a section on intergovernmental coordination.
This section must show the relationship between the adopted com-
prehensive plan and the plans of the state, the region, the county,
adjacent municipalities, and those units of local government which
provide services but which do not have regulatory authority over the
use of the land. The section must also state the principles and
guidelines to be used in accomplishing this intergovernmental coor-
dination.'
The intended relationship between this section and mandatory
general requirement of coordination appears unclear.'
166. Id.
167. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(f)(6) (1975).
168. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67
N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975); Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d
236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
169. 16 U.S.C. § 1453(a) (1970).
170. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(g) (1975).
171. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(h) (1975).
172. See section IV, C, 1, supra for a discussion of mandatory general coordination
requirements.
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i. Electrical Utilities
The plan must contain a section in conformance with the ten
year site plan'73 of the Florida Electrical Power Siting Act.'74
j. Mass Transit, Aviation and Ports
The optional specific requirements listed below dealing with
mass transit, aviation and ports are required for governmental units
with a population of more than 50,000 persons.'
3. OPTIONAL SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
The following types of sections may be included in the new
comprehensive plan adopted under the Act. 78 The plan may provide
for
a. mass transit systems and their attendent fiscal considera-
tions;'77
b. port and aviation facilities; '78
c. a nonautomotive circulation plan to include bicycle paths,
trails, riding facilities, etc.,-to be coordinated with the recreation
section and the circulation section;'78
d. an off-street parking plan; 80
e. a public services and facilities plan to cover areas not in-
cluded in the mandatory section (solid waste, potable water,
drainage, and sewers);'8'
f. a public building plan to include civic and community cen-
ters, public schools, hospitals, libraries, police and fire stations,
etc.;18 2
g. a community design plan;8 3
h. a community redevelopment plan for the redevelopment of
173. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(i) (1975).
174. FLA. STAT. § 403.501-15 (1975).
175. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(6)(j) (1975).
176. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(7)(a)-(1) (1975).
177. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(7)(a) (1975).
178. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(7)(b) (1975).
179. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(7)(c) (1975).
180. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(7)(d) (1975).
181. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(7)(e) (1975).
182. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(7)(f) (1975). This section would show how it is proposed to
establish coordination with governmental units, such as school boards or hospital authorities,
having public development and service responsibilities, capabilities, and potential, but do not
have land development regulatory authority.
183. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(7)(g) (1975).
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slums and blighted areas;'84
i. a safety plan for protection from fire, hurricane, or other cas-
tastrophe to include evacuation routes, water supply, minimum
road widths, clearances around structures, etc.;'85
j. a historical and scenic preservation plan;'8
k. an economic plan setting forth principles and guidelines for
the commercial and industrial development, if any, and the em-
ployment and manpower utilization within the area;'87
1. any other element which is peculiar to the area concerned.'88
An interesting conflict may arguably arise under these optional
requirements. As indicated earlier, if a local government fails to
adopt a comprehensive plan, the plan of the next higher level of
government is imposed on it. What if a county, for example, adopts
an optional element such as a community design plan? No such
element is adopted by the municipalities within the county since it
is not required. Is the county's design plan imposed on the
municipalities? Since it can logically be argued that the imposition
for nonadoption applies only to those mandated plan elements, the
design plan would probably not be imposed. Yet a strict reading of
the Act might lead to a contrary interpretation.
It will be recalled that both the mandatory and optional spe-
cific requirements are covered by the five mandatory general re-
quirements. Thus, each of the above sections would also be required
to include the fiscal realities of each proposal. Each section must
also describe how the proposal will be coordinated with the propos-
als of other municipalities and higher levels of government.
Finally, it is necessary to comment on the drafting of section
163.3177 which lists the various elements of a comprehensive plan.
It appears that everything and anything was thrown into this sec-
tion. There appears to be an extraordinary amount of potential
duplication between the various sections (e.g., recreation land use
-recreation plan; housing-community redevelopment; conserva-
tion-coastal protection; two sections on intergovernmental coor-
dination; public building land use-public building plan; etc.). It
184. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(7)(h) (1975).
185. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(7)(i) (1975).
186. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(7)(j) (1975).
187. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(7)(k) (1975). It may also detail the type of commercial and
industrial development sought.
188. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(7)(1) (1975).
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is suggested that the purposes of this act would be better served by
a tighter drafting which would have facilitated understanding by
local governments that have to live with it.
4. DATA
Since the comprehensive plan now becomes the primary land
use control tool, its restrictions on land presumably must be formed
on a rational basis, as is any exercise of the police power. Thus, the
plan requires all sections to be based on appropriate data from
studies, surveys and supporting documents. Though this data base
need not be part of the plan, it must be available for public inspec-
tion."9
D. Legal Status of a Plan Adopted Under the Act
The Act is vague in setting forth the mandated implementing
techniques to be applied to the plan once adopted. It merely states
that the plan shall be implemented in part by appropriate local
regulation 9 " as defined in another portion of the Act.' 9' Yet when
this cross reference is made, the definition refers only to "land de-
velopment regulations" such as zoning subdivision and building
codes. 9 ' Thus, it would appear the Act gives direction only for the
implementation of the land use element of the plan and not to the
many other areas required.
The Act significantly changes the effect on governmental agen-
cies. Under the Act all development by government agencies is now
subject to the same requirements as development by private devel-
opers.' 3 This provision follows the recent trend away from holding
government agencies immune from municipal zoning.' 4
The most significant portion of the Act is the section which
defines the legal status of a comprehensive plan adopted under the
189. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(8) (1975).
190. FLA. STAT. § 163.3201 (1975).
191. FLA. STAT. § 163.3194(2)(b) (1975).
192. Id.
193. FLA. STAT. § 163.3164(3) (1975). The supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2,
prevents the application of this section to the federal government.
194. See Hillsborough Ass'n for Retarded. Citizens v. City of Temple Terrace, 332 So.
2d 610 (Fla. 1976), noted in 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 191 (1976); Parkway Towers Condominium
Ass'n v. Metropolitan Dade County, 295 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 1974); Orange County v. City of
Apopka, 299 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
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Act.'95 The Act requires that, once a plan has been adopted under
it, all development undertaken by, and all actions taken in regard
to development orders by, governmental agencies in regard to land
covered by the plan must be consistent with the plan. In addition,
once the plan is adopted by the governing body, no land develop-
ment regulation'98 or land development code can be adopted until
it has been sent to the local planning agency for review of its rela-
tionship with the adopted comprehensive plan.'97 Further, the Act
directs a court, when reviewing a governmental action or regulation,
to consider its reasonableness in the light of the adopted compre-
hensive plan.' 8
This consistency requirement does, however, have one limita-
tion. Nothing in the Act can limit or modify the rights of a person
to complete a development authorized as a development of regional
impact under chapter 380 of the Florida Statutes.'99 In construing
this provision, the Attorney General has held that the Act and chap-
ter 380 (the Florida Environmental Land and Water Act of 1972)
"must be read together in their objectives of guiding development
and growth and the protection of private property interests as well
as protecting environmental quality." 00 Thus, a local government
cannot adopt a comprehensive plan under the Act which would
amend a previously issued development order.
It is suggested that the consistency provision will prove to be a
major area of litigation in the future. It does not appear that
"consistent with" is defined in the Act. Unfortunately, official state
pronouncements provide little insight. The Division of State Plan-
ning says that "consistent" means "in agreement or harmony; in
accord; compatible."20' The Department of Community Affairs is
less helpful. It states that the methods by which consistency can be
determined "will vary."2 2
195. FLA. STAT. § 163.3194 (1975).
196. "Land Development regulations" is defiend as "zoning, subdivision, building and
construction, or other regulations controlling the development of land." FLA. STAT. §
163.3194(2)(b) (1975).
197. FLA. STAT. § 163.3194(2)(a) (1975).
198. FLA. STAT. § 163.3194(3)(a) (1975).
199. FLA. STAT. § 163.3167(.10) (1975).
200. Fla. Att'y Gen. Op. 077-7 (Jan. 25, 1977).
201. Division of State Planning, Questions and Answers/Positions Pertaining to the
Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act 33 (unpublished paper, January 15, 1976).
202. DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, A LOCAL OFFICIAL'S GUIDE TO THE LOCAL Gov-
ERNMENT COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING ACT 6-6 (Sept. 1976).
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Perhaps a reasonable interpretation of this consistency require-
ment would be that development orders or regulations be consistent
with the general plan when the use or standard in the development
order or regulations is one that tends to further the policies of the
comprehensive plan.
Another area which this writer finds confusing is posed by the
question "What must be consistent with what?" It is worthwhile to
repeat the pertinent sections.
Mter a comprehensive plan or element or portion thereof has
been adopted in conformity with this act, all development under-
taken by, and all actions taken in regard to development orders
by, governmental agencies in regard to land covered by such plan
or element shall be consistent with such plan or element as
adopted. All land development regulations enacted or amended
shall be consistent with the adopted comprehensive plan or ele-
ment or portion thereof.203
For purposes of this subsection, "land development regulations"
or "regulations for the development of land" include any local
government zoning, subdivision, building and construction, or
other regulations controlling the development of land. The var-
ious types of local government regulations or laws dealing with
the development of land within a jurisdiction may be combined
in their totality in a single document known as the "land develop-
ment code" of the jurisdiction."4
The thrust of the sections appears to be aimed at the land use
element of the plan. However, just as zoning and subdivision affect
the use of land, so does an economic policy, an environmental pol-
icy, or a capital improvements policy. Also to be considered is an-
other portion of the Act which states that "[i]t is the intent of this
Act that the comprehensive plan set general guidelines and princi-
ples concerning its purposes and contents and that this act shall be
construed broadly to accomplish its stated purposes and
objectives. "25
It is contended that if the above three emphasized portions of
the Act are read together, the plan becomes the sine qua non of any
action, the scope of which is within the Act. This result is reached
203. FLA. STAT. § 163.3194(1) (1975) (emphasis added).
204. FLA. STAT. § 163.3194(2)(b) (1975) (emphasis added).
205. FLA. STAT. § 163.3194(3)(b) (1975) (emphasis added).
19771
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
if "development regulations" is "construed broadly" as any regula-
tion or action which directly or indirectly affects land. Given this
interpretation, the Act becomes all encompassing.
V. CONCLUSION
It has been suggested that a plan adopted under the Act "is not
intended as a blueprint for the future, but rather is to be 'a reference
point for agreed upon policy to guide day to day governmental deci-
sions."'' 10 But can this really be the case under the Act? In a hearing
in Broward County on the proposed land use element plan, the
thrust of the entire hearing was not on the overall policies of the
plan, nor on whether growth should be generally limited in one area
or encouraged in another, nor on developing a coherent approach to
guiding development within the county. Rather, the thrust of the
hearing was on arguments that can only be described as nar-
row-why "my piece is designated as six units to the acre and not
fifteen units to the acre." 07 It is suggested that this response by
property owners was entirely rational as they perceived the plan not
as a "reference point" but rather as a new tier of land use regula-
tions to be superimposed on the already burdensome maze of regula-
tions to which they were presently subject. This reaction aptly dem-
onstrates the negative effects on the planning process when compre-
hensive planning is replaced by piecemeal land use designation.
There is an important distinction between the two, and it was not
observed in Broward County. Rational planning analysis must pre-
cede specific designations.
However, an argument can be made that the intent of the Act
is not to create a "second tier of zoning." The Act's section which
was described above °0 indicates that the Act's intent was to be
construed broadly, and thus could be extended to more than just
direct land development decisions. It also provides that the plan
"set general guidelines and principles. '"2 09 Thus, it can be argued
that the plan is not to act as a new land use regulation. However,
the question still remains as to how specific and detailed adherence
206. Greene, Planning Is Dull But It's Necessary, Miami Herald, Sept. 26, 1976 at 3E,
col. 3, quoting Lt. Gov. Jim Williams.
207. Hearing on the Broward County Master Plan, Broward County Courthouse, August
21, 1976; see Miami Herald, Broward Section, Aug. 21, 1976 at 1BR, col. 4.
208. FLA. STAT. § 163.3194(3)(b) (1975); see text accompanying note 205 supra.
209. FLA. STAT. § 163.3194(3)(b) (1975).
[Vol. 31:1119
LAND USE PLANNING
to the plan must be before the proposed action is "consistent" with
it.
Logic and accepted planning principles would dictate an ap-
proach similar to that found in the Oregon decisions:"' That the
plan becomes the primary standard of review in order to test the
reasonableness of the action in question. A more narrow interpreta-
tion which would require strict compliance with the plan would, in
effect, create a "new zoning." This would result in the destruction
of the usefulness of the plan as a broad policy instrument.
It is suggested that in order for planning in general, and the
plan specifically to become an effective device for guiding growth
patterns, land development decisions should be considered
"consistent" with the comprehensive plan when the uses contem-
plated under the decision are compatible with the overall goals and
objectives of the plan. This position is advocated since it permits
the comprehensive plan to reflect the goals and objectives of the
local municipality and at the same time preserves a certain amount
of flexibility by allowing growth to proceed as the community's
needs change. This important purpose of a comprehensive plan is
destroyed if development decisions were considered consistent with
a comprehensive plan only when they meet the specific uses pro-
vided for in the plan.
A potential problem arises if this latter, strict position is
adopted. Under the Act, amendments of less than five percent of the
land area of the jurisdiction can be implemented by the governing
body alone. If it were necessary to amend the plan each time a
rezoning is enacted or variance granted, then the result will be no
applications of over five percent. Rather, there will be numerous
"specific amendments" that will seriously undermine the integrity
of the plan. The purpose of the Act-to create a legal relationship
between development decisions and regulations and comprehensive
planning-will be destroyed.
Prior to its adoption, several commentators looked forward to
the Act's arrival with great anticipation."' It promised to rationalize
local decisionmaking and would make "[tihe planning program
210. See text accompanying notes 62-70 supra.
211. Barendt, Comprehensive Development Planning in England: Historical Experience
and Some Comparisons with Florida's Proposed Legislation, 2 FLA. ST. L. REV. 415, 444
(1974); Commentary, Preservation of Florida's Agricultural Resources Through Land Use
Planning, 27 U. FLA. L. REv. 130, 140 (1974); Note, Comprehensive Land Use Plans and the
Consistency Requirement, 2 FLA. ST. L. REv. 766, 786 (1974).
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. a continuous and ongoing process." ' The fulfillment of these
promises is at best doubtful,"' but certainly impossible, if the courts
are not careful in their approach to the consistency requirement.
Making the comprehensive plan a land use control device de-
stroys the premise that the plan should be an official public docu-
ment adopted by a local government as a guide to policy decisions
about its community.
If the consistency requirement were interpreted too narrowly,
the legal relationship between the comprehensive plan and the im-
plementing regulation will cause the existing planning process to
suffer. When planning has a precise legal status, it is burdened by
political and special interests. If the comprehensive plan is to be
equated with zoning and other implementing regulations, pressures
will be applied to the planning process which will produce a plan of
the lowest common denominator in a political environment.
The Local Government Planning Act represents a major effort
to rationalize the planning process in Florida. Unfortunately, it is
plagued with ambiguous drafting, unanswered questions and an
enormous potential to produce litigation. It probably never would
have been necessary if zoning had originally been enacted "in ac-
cordance with a comprehensive plan."
212. FLA. STAT. § 163.3191(1) (1975). The argument that planning should be an ongoing
"process" rather than aim to produce an "end-state" plan is not a new one. See, e.g., M.
BRANCH, CITY PLANNING AND AERIAL INFORMATION 18 (1971).
213. It is interesting to note that the Act was originally not funded. V AIP/FSU
LEGISLATIVE REPORTING SERVICE No. 3 at 1 (Dec. 14, 1976). Funds were not provided until the
1977 session of the legislature.
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